64th ANNIVERSARY OF INDONESIAN NATIONAL ARMY
Elite Must Immediately Conduct Civil Military Reform
We are a coalition of civil society today so congratulations to the Indonesian National Army (TNI) of the 64 on October 5, 2009. Momentum is so common today commemorated by a number of circles in Indonesia, especially by the TNI. In addition to the anniversary is celebrated, the momentum is also important to evaluate the existence of the TNI period of political transition in Indonesia, and especially towards the workings of the new Government and the Parliament election results 2009. On the other hand, we are concerned with the lack of military reform outcomes as a mandate by by Law No. 3 of 2002 on State Defense and Law no. 2004 about 34 years of Indonesian National Army. These agendas in the form; military justice reform is never complete, the takeover of military business process that does not touch all the issues that surrounded it and peruses restructuring territorial command and accountability of the TNI to cases of human rights violations in the past. Consequently, there is a reasonable thing to say as the focus of our evaluation;
First, the Military Justice Reform
2009 This year is the deadline for the period of public administration and parliament to complete one of the military sector reform agenda (TNI), the revision of the military justice system. This regulataion is being mandated by the People's Consultative Assembly (TAP MPR) No.. VII of 2000 on the Role of the Indonesian National Army and the Role of the State Police of the Republic of Indonesia, in Article 3 (4). and Law No. 34/2004 on the Indonesian National Army of Article 65 paragraph (2). During this, the old system which has jurisdiction to prosecute military personnel for acts of violation / crime-whether any military crime or a crime generally is one source of impunity practice. Unfortunately until the end of the period 2004-2009 the government and parliament, the revision has not yet occurred.
More worrying again, from General Meeting (RDPU) with the House of Representatives (DPR) the Department of Defense (DoD) and Army instead sued VII/2000 TAP MPR mandate-which they are no longer valid, and declare that Article 65 (2 ) Act No. 34/3004 on the military court jurisdiction change as something imposed. Obviously this is a political stance against the democratic reform agenda from a civil supremacy.
One major blockages reform the military justice system is the strengthening of the government-through the Department of Defense, to continue to authorize the investigation and the investigation to the military and not to the police. This is quite ironic considering various stakeholders (civil institutions) have a clear position for institutional reform of the military justice system based on democratic principles. Almost all the factions in the military justice committee has approved the provision of external accountability (law enforcement device from outside the military) for an offense / crime / general crime committed was a military personnel. Even the police and the Attorney General in Public Hearings Meeting with members of the House Special Committee has expressed its readiness to perform investigative functions and investigation (Police) and prosecution (Attorney General). The reason the Department of Defense and the TNI that civil institutions are not ready to deal with military personnel in law enforcement process is clear form of governance insubordinate by civilian supremacy. To authorize the investigation to the military remains clearly violates the principles of impartiality and independence of the principle of a judicial system and to deviate from the prevailing legal system.
Delaying completion of the military justice system reform is clearly a barrier to efforts to seek justice authentic format for considering this impunity so thick fortress for the few people (members of the TNI). In addition, a clear delay in the military justice system reform is a violation of the law's mandate.
Parliament should set the period 2009-2014 was one of the Act a top priority to include in the agenda National Legislation Programme. The steps forward in the previous discussion should be followed up with a decision on the impasse in the discussion of the authority of the prosecution authority, by basing itself on military reform and obey adherence to an integrated system of criminal (criminal justice system)
Second, military business restructuring
Article 76 of law no. 3 years of Defense in 2002 stated: "In a period of 5 (five) years since the enactment of this Act [in September 2004], the Government should take over all business activities owned and managed by the military either directly or indirectly. " In 2005 government established the Business Transformation Supervision Team implement these laws. Unfortunately does not include the takeover of all military business. Foundations and cooperatives are allowed to continue because the agencies are independent entities and separated from the military. Furthermore foundations and cooperatives are considered to carry out social functions for the welfare of soldiers. The issue is the restructuring of the military business has two main problems, first, that the definition does not include military business or the business practices involving economic military officers, both individually and institutionally, are often not implemented in a fair and contain violence. Second, the restructuring practice is implemented within a period long enough, but not with optimal results in eroding the problem.
Third, Territorial Command
TNI reform is expected to be from the state defense force outside attacks (external military) have not realized. This is still visible with the strength of the Territorial Command sturuktur (Koter) in various areas (kodam, military region command, Kodim, Koramil). This indicates that the TNI is still considered the people as a potential threat that needs to be cautious. Instead, it is exacerbated by the weakness of civil society oversight of the TNI.
Territorial Command owned by the TNI still understood as an ongoing operation to counter and overcome all kinds of security problems such as horizontal conflict, the conflict in Papua and terrorism. This causes the main task of the TNI as the main tool neglected national defense. Even further in the matter of most of the cost of budgeting for the military budget for operations consumed only Koter. Campaign to defend recent Koter also linked to efforts to deal with acts of terrorism regardless of the mechanism as support system to police authorities take action against the evil of terrorism authorities (see Article 7 paragraph 3 of Law No.34/2004 on TNI, Article 41 of Law No.2/2002 on Police, and from 4 paragraph (2) of MPR Decree No. VII. in 2000). Furthermore, military involvement in acts of terrorism are not equipped with other sector reforms, such as the reform of military justice. Fear if the military personnel involved in the action arbitrarily in counter-terrorism, pursued legal mechanisms are still using the old military justice mechanisms (Law no. 31 / 1997) is not credible and lead to impunity (crime without punishment).
Prominence of the TNI's territorial function now indicates the lack of willingness to become a military force of professional war-century modern war. Command territorial less correlated directly with national defense in the face of the threat of attack from the outside, so the next immediate audit of the structure, amount, distribution and use of military Alusista.
Slowly TNI reform implementation process in the five-year period was first and foremost is caused more by weak civilian leadership in promoting military reform processes. Weakness was seen from the lack of political will and civil leaders in parliament, weak human resources in understanding the issues related to defense and security.
As a State which adopted democratic systems, advanced toward the withdrawal of the reform process would depend on the vision of political leaders, considering the State as a means of military defense obedient and subject to political authority (civilian supremacy). Thus, the direction of military reform processes fore also depends on the political will and good will of government to the fore.
Jakarta, 04 October 2009
KONTRAS, IMPARSIAL, PRAXIS